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The world is not running out of fossil fuels, as is often claimed. With technological prog-
ress and favorable economic conditions, a process of resource-base expansion occurs 
through the production of resources that were previously considered economically unviable. 
Resource-base expansion requires increasing capital investments per unit of energy extracted 
and an accompanying rise in production costs per unit. The world is running out of cheap fossil 
fuels, and in the long term, dependence on fossil fuels leads to energy services that are much 
more expensive and inaccessible. Given other important incentives for transitioning from fossil 
fuels, such as the need to mitigate global warming and eliminate the geopolitical struggles over 
the remaining fossil fuel reserves, the only alternative is a decades-long complex transforma-
tion of energy systems toward renewables. This brief narrates the evolution of this transition 
toward modern renewables by drawing on experiences of several countries and argues that 
these transitions will play a significant role on a global scale, because followers learn from the 
experience of pioneers.
Rising Production Costs as a Driver for Energy Transition 
to Modern Renewables
Extraction and processing technologies for most types of commonly used materials were 
known long before the 20th century. Nevertheless, the ability to extract, process, and trans-
port biomass and minerals has been limited by the amount of available energy supply. The 
18th and 19th centuries brought qualitative changes that were the result of two interrelated 
transitions in energy systems. The first transition was a change in the main source of pri-
mary energy from biomass to fossil fuels, initially coal. The second transition was a change 
in energy converters, or so-called end-use technologies, from human and animal power to 
machines, which transformed the chemical energy of fossil fuels into useful mechanical 
power. Energy transitions to fossil fuels and new energy converters imposed fundamental 
technological changes in most aspects of human activity. Energy consumption per capita, 
labor productivity, and consumption of materials have risen by several orders of magni-
tude during the last two centuries. Technological changes were also integral to economic 
growth and social development.1 Historically, a higher volume of primary energy consump-
tion meant a higher human development index, higher rates of individual wealth and life 
expectancy, better nutrition, and lower mortality rates.2 Estimated at about 50 billion tons 
per year,3 the current level of global material consumption would not be possible to sus-
tain without the use of more than 13,000 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) of primary 
energy, with 80% coming from fossil fuels.4  
The total dependence of modern living standards on fossil energy has spurred debates 
about the long-term availability of energy resources. The assessment of the long- 
term availability of natural resources is often based on a rather simple reserves-to-
production (R/P) ratio. Table 1 presents current R/P ratios for fossil hydrocarbons. 
In fact, the R/P ratio only illustrates the years it will take to completely deplete the 
proven reserves of a particular conventional resource estimated for a certain con-
sumption rate at the particular year and does not reflect the fundamental process 
of resource-base expansion through moving “unconventional resources” to the 
“conventional” category (explained below). In fact, R/P figures for oil and natural 
gas have held steady at the level of 40 to 50 years for the past 30 years.5 
To start transformation of 
energy systems toward 
renewables, followers need 
to have opportunities 
to learn from the success 
and failure of pioneers. 
Thus, cross-national 
cooperation is necessary.
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“Best first” is a well-established principle in economic theory.7 
Historically, people tend to first use easy and cheap-to-extract 
(conventional) resources of coal, oil, and natural gas located 
close to consumers. As initial deposits become exhausted, peo-
ple start to use unconventional resources, those that generally 
cannot be extracted with technology and processes used for 
conventional resources, because of lower concentrations, dif-
ferent geological or geographical settings, or different chemical 
compositions.8 Thus, the future accessibility of unconventional 
resources is a question of technological progress.9  
The difference in production costs between easy-to-access and 
difficult-to-access resources characterizes every energy sys-
tem, even biomass-based ones.10 Extraction of oil and natural 
gas from unconventional resources is characterized by higher 
production costs as well. Thus, inventions that allow exploita-
tion of unconventional resources could be widely adopted only 
under favorable economic conditions. Given higher costs per 
unit of energy produced and mammoth fixed costs to install 
complex engineering infrastructures, expansion of the resource 
base by moving unconventional resources into the convention-
al category occurs in periods of high commodity prices, which 
provide economic incentives for territory expansion and inno-
vative activity in exploration, extraction, transportation, and 
processing. When the flow of energy resources from unpacked 
unconventional deposits gluts the market, prices fall dramati-
cally, providing economic incentives to reduce the costs of 
production from unconventional resources. Even under strong 
competitive pressure, however, producing a barrel of oil or a 
cubic foot of natural gas from unconventional resources costs 
more than producing it from conventional ones. The shale rev-
olution in oil and natural gas production provides a great ex-
ample of the process described above: costs per unit produced 
increased substantially when unconventional resources were 
involved in operations.11   
Production costs per barrel of oil increased dramatically in the 
last decade. In 2011, the 50 largest oil companies (except those 
in OPEC and former Soviet countries) were spending $35.9 to 
produce one barrel, almost a sevenfold increase in just one de-
cade (see Figure 1). Unconventional resources are only a part 
of the reason for such a cost surge. Costs of production from 
conventional oil reserves also soared. Steven Kopits, managing 
director of Douglas-Westwood, pointed out the following:  
In 2005–2013 we [the world] have spent about $4 tril-
lion on finding and getting the oil. Of this, $350 bil-
lion were spent on US and Canadian unconvention-
als, $150 billion on liquid natural gas, and $3.5 trillion 
were spent on maintaining the legacy of oil and gas 
systems in the last seven years; $2.5 trillion were spent 
on crude oil production alone, and that bought a de-
cline in production of 1 million barrels per day (mbpd) 
compared to 2005. For comparison, in 1998–2005 we 
spent $1.5 trillion and added 8.6 mbpd crude produc-
tion. We have historically added a lot more in produc-
tion for a lot less money… [In 2005–2008] we spent an 
unbelievable amount of money to try to hold down 
the front on the legacy system of 2005.12   
Moreover, instead of higher production costs, replacing 
easy-to-access resources with difficult-to-access resources 
requires extensive capital investments on the national level. 
Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), stated that “to keep at the current level of oil 
production, Russia needs to invest more than $700 billion in its 
oil industry by 2035 and to provide a more favorable tax regime 
for businesses.”13  
Summarizing, energy is a depletion-based business that must 
replace its reserves. Capital expenditures to expand resource 
base are gigantic, production costs from unconventional 
resources are very high, and costs of production from conven-
tional reserves also increase over time. Energy is available, but 
could we pay a price to cover permanently increasing costs? If 
a price is lower than marginal costs, as at the beginning of 2016, 
there are no incentives for expansion and investments in explo-
ration plummet, which in the long term leads to shortages and 
price spikes. When a price is high, energy becomes even more 
inaccessible for many; social consequences are obvious— 
economic poverty goes hand in hand with energy poverty. Keep-
ing in mind other important incentives for transitioning from 
fossil fuels, such as mitigating global warming and eliminating 
the geopolitical struggles over remaining fossil fuel reserves, 
the solution also seems obvious—a transition from fossil fuels 
to a new energy mix based on renewable energy resources.
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Table 1. Reserves, Production, and R/P Ratio for Hydrocarbons6
Resource Reserves  Production  Reserves-to- 
   Production Ratio
Oil  1,646 billion barrels (2013) 33 billion barrels per year (2013)  50 years
Natural Gas  6,810 trillion cubic feet (2012) 119 trillion cubic feet per year (2012) 57 years
Coal 980 billion tons (2011) 8.4 billion tons per year (2011) 117 years
Barriers to Transformation  
At first glance, the transition from fossil fuels to modern renew-
ables appears to be in a very active phase. Over the last decade, 
most countries have set long-term renewable target goals14  and 
have started to use modern renewables, mostly sun and wind 
energy, as the source of primary energy. More than 130 coun-
tries have become members of the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), which focuses on doubling the share 
of renewables by 2030.15 China is the world’s largest wind mar-
ket with more than 100 gigawatts (GW) of wind capacity, equiv-
alent to about 65,000 turbines, and is currently adding more 
than 30 new turbines per day.16 Germany is the leading solar 
photovoltaic (PV) nation with about 36 GW of installed capac-
ity.17 However, these are just the first small steps on the thorny 
road to providing the current level of energy consumption 
without burning fossil fuels. Achieving quick success in energy 
transition to renewables is a significant challenge for at least 
three reasons. 
First, the supply of renewable electricity is still tiny compared 
to the amount of energy consumed globally. The amount of in-
stalled capacity of modern renewables that is required to sup-
ply enough energy to satisfy all current energy needs could be 
analyzed through power densities of different energy supply 
technologies. By “power density,” Vaclav Smil, a distinguished 
professor emeritus at the University of Manitoba, means the 
number of usable watts that can be produced per square meter 
of land (or water) by a given technology.18,19 Fossil fuel–based 
supply infrastructures are characterized by a power density of 
100–2,000 W/m2, compared to 0.5–9 W/m2 for modern renew-
ables. Smil notes that supplying the current amount of primary 
energy with high-density infrastructures requires a total area 
equal to the territory of Belgium. To produce the same amount 
of energy with low-density infrastructures requires “roughly an 
equivalent of the entire territories of the United States and In-
dia, an area more than 400 times larger than the space taken 
up by all of modern energy’s infrastructures.”20 A shift away 
from fossil fuels is the first transition in the industrial era from 
high-density fuels to low-density fuels, and it is likely to be a 
generations-long process. Moreover, the substitution of capital-
intensive fossil fuel–based infrastructure would be economi-
cally feasible only at the end of that infrastructure’s 30–50 year 
life cycle. 
Second, there are no ready markets where renewable electricity 
can be used in providing many of the essential energy services. 
Renewable electricity can substitute the electricity produced 
by burning coal, but it cannot yet substitute coal as the energy 
carrier in cement production or diesel in sea transportation. 
Current end-use energy technologies, such as heat technolo-
gies, transportation, and industrial processes, absolutely de-
pend on fossil-based energy carriers; the share of coal in global 
final energy consumption is 10%, natural gas 16%, and products 
of oil refineries 41%.21 In 2012, the share of electricity in global 
final energy consumption was only 18%, which actually is the 
maximum share of final energy consumption that could be sup-
plied with renewable electricity today without massive substi-
tution of current end-use technologies and without fundamen-
tal changes in the design of many of them. Energy transition to 
modern renewables requires new end-use infrastructures such 
as turbines, engines, boilers, furnaces, kilns, and new industrial 
processes for the production of steel, cement, stone, plastics, 
and paper, among others. Such technologies and processes 
first have to be designed to use renewable electricity as the en-
ergy carrier, and then be scaled globally. Scholars emphasize 
that energy transitions on a supply side are driven precisely by 
technological shifts in end-use technologies.22 In reality, mostly 
opposite tendencies prevail. End-use technologies that use en-
ergy carriers produced from fossil fuels are growing in scale. 
The number of motor vehicles will likely double by 2050, and 
the share of electric vehicles will remain relatively small;23 simi-
larly, the number of aircraft will likely increase from 21,000 to 
42,000 by 2033.24  
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Figure 1. Increasing costs of oil barrel production. Global unit costs 
increased to a record high of 35.9 $/boc.
4Third, energy transitions are not only a matter of technologi-
cal change. Social innovations, along with technological inno-
vations, have been core drivers of historical energy transitions 
and remain so in future scenarios.25 To conduct an energy tran-
sition, many significant changes would need to occur in the 
economy, financial and social institutions, politics, and even 
ideology. As Smil notes, “A careful investigation of energy tran-
sitions always reveals that their progress requires a specific 
sequence of scientific advances, technical innovations, orga-
nizational actions, and economic, political and strategic cir-
cumstances. Missing a single component in such a sequence, 
or delaying its introduction or effects because of some unfore-
seen events, results in very different outcomes and in lengthier 
transition periods.”26 Naïve statements27 that single inventions 
lead to a bright future usually overestimate the importance of 
technology improvements and underestimate the significance 
of intangible elements of energy systems.
Obstacles are significant, and a world powered by modern re-
newables in 2050 or earlier is more a fantasy than a reality. It 
would be a mistake, however, to evaluate efforts to transform 
energy systems from a global perspective. As examples of the 
past illustrate, technological change occurs by clusters of radi-
cal innovations forming successive and distinct revolutions28 
that erupt in a particular country or region and then spread 
across the world. Several countries have already begun unique 
and complex transformations of their energy systems with very 
clear goals of keeping the current level of welfare, reducing con-
sumption of primary energy, changing energy supply technolo-
gies, adapting end-use and supplementary technologies to new 
energy carriers, and initiating huge social change in order to 
overcome dependence on fossil hydrocarbons. An inspiring les-
son from the history of energy transitions is that adopters have 
implemented the experience of the pioneers.29  
Energy Transitions in Pioneering Countries 
Denmark is the first country that has aimed to supply 100% of 
its energy demand (not just electricity!) with renewable energy. 
Following the ambitious Energy Strategy 2050—from coal, oil 
and gas to green energy,30 the Danish government aims, by 2050, 
to substitute the current energy system, which has a total pri-
mary energy supply of 18 Mtoe and 75% share of fossil hydro-
carbons,31 with an energy system that has a total primary en-
ergy supply of 10 Mtoe and 0% of fossil energy in the mix.32 Such 
transformation is possible without a decrease in consumption 
of energy services only if very bold goals in efficiency on both 
supply and demand sides are achieved—if electricity demand 
in households is decreased by almost 50% by 2050 and if elec-
tricity demand in industry and services is reduced by 45%. 
Other meaningful milestones on a path to a 100% renewable-
energy society by 2050 include 100% of vehicles being either 
electric or hybrid; railroads and trams meeting approximately 
40% of the transportation demand, compared to 15–20% to-
day; more than 60% of electricity produced by wind; and in-
dividual heat provided mostly by heat pumps (60%) and solar 
thermal (20%).33  
Germany is the first country with a relatively large territory 
and significant energy consumption (313 Mtoe in 201234) to an-
nounce that it has already started an energy transition, Ener-
giewende, to renewables in the power sector. One of the main 
prospective achievements of the energy transition is to in-
crease the share of final energy supply provided by renewables 
to about 60% by 2050 from less than 10% in 2011.35 In order to 
reduce overall costs, the transition would have to be based on 
existing technologies but not on technologies that are far from 
scaling and that require large subsidies.
With 115 GW of wind and 28 GW of solar PV, China is the global 
leader in installed capacity of wind and second (after Germany) 
in installed capacity of solar PV.36 China doesn’t have an official 
national strategy for energy transition toward renewables. But, 
the China National Renewable Energy Center published road 
maps that provide insights on China’s long-term energy vision 
for transforming its energy system by 2050: more than 80% of 
electricity would be provided by renewable energy; installed 
capacity of solar PV would be 1,000 GW; installed capacity of 
wind would be 2,000 GW; 400 million out of 500 million passen-
ger vehicles would be electric; and China would rely on renew-
ables for more than 60% of its total energy needs.37 
Another important example of energy-systems transforma-
tion toward renewables is the ambitious strategy launched in 
Japan in 2013. The Strategic Road Map for Hydrogen and Fuel 
Cells38 envisions a completely new energy infrastructure (both 
on the demand and supply side) based on local zero-carbon 
energy supply and carbon-free energy consumption. According 
to the road map, the first phase of creating a hydrogen society 
starts in the mid-2010s and focuses on the expansion of hydro-
gen applications, such as fuel cells for households and fuel cell 
vehicles. Actually, the first phase of the Japanese transition is 
focused precisely on creating multiple markets for hydrogen 
as an energy carrier. The focus of the second phase, which 
starts in the mid-2020s, will be establishing a hydrogen sup-
ply system, first using imported natural gas as a feedstock. In 
order to reduce environmental impact, hydrogen production 
plants will include carbon-capture and storage technology. In 
the early 2040s, in the third phase, when demand has matured 
on import-based supply, the main focus will be on creating a 
carbon-free hydrogen supply system and substituting natural 
gas–based supply systems with a new supply system based on 
technologies that produce hydrogen using modern renewables, 
such as wind-to-gas technologies.  
Establishing energy systems based on modern renewables in 
the developing world is vital for the economic and social de-
velopment. One of the major development goals is to provide 
access to modern energy services (electricity and clean cooking 
facilities) for about 3 billion people, mostly in Africa and South 
Asia, who use mainly biomass to satisfy their energy needs. 
Solutions to fight poverty and to provide universal access to 
modern energy services for all could come with a transition to 
renewables because of four factors.  
First, given recent technological progress, the developing 
world’s technological potential for modern renewables is sig-
nificant. Most developing countries have an irradiance level 
much higher than in Germany. 
Second, modern renewables are relatively cheap for consumers 
in the developing world. According to the 2015 Africa Progress 
Report, because they are isolated from modern energy technol-
ogies, millions of Africans pay nearly the highest prices in the 
world for energy. These prices can reach as much as U.S.$10/
kWh for lighting alone, which is approximately 100 times the 
amount spent in the United States (U.S.$0.12/kWh).39  
Third, strategies that worked in twentieth century for devel-
oped countries, which became industrialized using fossil fuels, 
will not work for the developing world. Fossil fuel–based en-
ergy systems are not a solution to providing universal access to 
energy in the developing world. Fossil fuel reserves are distrib-
uted extremely unevenly. For instance, 90% of all proven Afri-
can natural gas reserves exist in four countries (Nigeria, Alge-
ria, Egypt, and Libya), and 97% of African coal reserves reside in 
only two countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe).40 Moreover, 
even developing countries with abundant energy resources do 
not prosper. Oil-rich Nigeria simply exports about 95% of its oil 
and uses mainly biomass for its own energy consumption (82% 
of the total primary energy supply).41 Developing countries lack 
end-use technologies, such as cars, and complementary infra-
structures, such as roads, that would allow them to use their 
natural resources in providing energy services. Such improve-
ments usually come with institutional changes. 
Fourth, policy adoption is critical for developing countries, and 
there is no deficit of cases from which to learn: India, Kenya, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and many other countries provide cas-
es of adoption.42 For instance, the Indian government extends 
household solar projects with massive subsidies allowing every 
home to run two lightbulbs, a solar cooker, and a television.43 
India also offers a great example of adoption of modern re-
newables in agriculture, swapping out 26 million fossil-fuel– 
powered groundwater pumps with solar-powered ones.44 
Energy transition toward modern renewables in the develop-
ing world is no longer a question of technological develop-
ment but of policy adoption. For developing countries, it may 
be hard to learn from examples in Denmark or Germany. But, 
they could learn from India, Bangladesh, or other pioneer 
countries in the developing world, which could enable them 
to leapfrog over traditional physical energy infrastructure 
by focusing on individual access to electricity using modern 
renewable technologies. 
Conclusion
With policy support and multibillion-dollar investments, over 
the last four decades wind and solar PV energy technologies 
mostly reached grid parity in pioneering countries. At least in 
the power sector of developed countries, energy transition to 
renewables is not a question of technological development. 
For further success in transitioning from fossil fuels, pioneer-
ing countries have to focus on creating markets to adopt re-
newables in transportation and industry sectors. Examples of 
past energy transitions illustrate that clusters of new break-
through technologies were first adopted by progressive societ-
ies, and only after that, followers implemented the experience 
of pioneers. Thus, the meaning of modern energy transitions in 
pioneering countries—Denmark, Germany, China, India, and 
Japan—is hard to overestimate.
International diffusion of renewable energy technologies has 
typically been preceded by the international diffusion of regula-
tion.45 To start transformation of energy systems toward renew-
ables, followers need to have opportunities to learn from the 
success and failure of pioneers. Thus, cross-national coopera-
tion is necessary. There are several international organizations 
that already focus on facilitating cross-national learning about 
renewable energy, such as IRENA, the Sustainable Energy for 
All initiative (SE4All), and their numerous partners. Collabo-
ration between Denmark and China in the form of the Sino-
Danish Renewable Energy Programme is a perfect example of 
an instrument through which an adopter is directly acquiring 
expertise and experience from a pioneering country and then, 
in turn, is becoming a pioneer in its own region. Due to a posi-
tive correlation between the level of economic development 
and the amount of energy consumption, efforts to transform 
energy systems in the developing world from biomass toward 
modern renewables could act as a driving force to eliminate 
energy poverty.
On a global level, energy transition to renewables is very much 
at its beginning, and it would be misleading to expect fun-
damental changes in a short period of time. Due to the large 
scale of current fossil-fuel–based energy systems, their inter-
connectedness with other technological systems, and their 
ubiquity throughout societies, energy transitions toward mod-
ern renewables have incarnated the Lampedusa principle 
that “everything must change in order that nothing change.” 
Transformation of energy systems toward modern renewables 
is a long-term process of complex technological and societal 
changes that can be accomplished through a determined effort 
of many generations.
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